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Abstract
Searching for information is critical in many situations. In medicine, for instance, careful choice of
a diagnostic test can help narrow down the range of plausible diseases that the patient might have. In a
probabilistic framework, test selection is often modeled by assuming that people’s goal is to reduce
uncertainty about possible states of the world. In cognitive science, psychology, and medical decision
making, Shannon entropy is the most prominent and most widely used model to formalize probabilistic
uncertainty and the reduction thereof. However, a variety of alternative entropy metrics (Hartley,
Quadratic, Tsallis, Renyi, and more) are popular in the social and the natural sciences, computer
science, and philosophy of science. Particular entropy measures have been predominant in particular
research areas, and it is often an open issue whether these divergences emerge from different theoreti-
cal and practical goals or are merely due to historical accident. Cutting across disciplinary boundaries,
we show that several entropy and entropy reduction measures arise as special cases in a unified formal-
ism, the Sharma–Mittal framework. Using mathematical results, computer simulations, and analyses
of published behavioral data, we discuss four key questions: How do various entropy models relate to
each other? What insights can be obtained by considering diverse entropy models within a unified
framework? What is the psychological plausibility of different entropy models? What new questions
and insights for research on human information acquisition follow? Our work provides several new
pathways for theoretical and empirical research, reconciling apparently conflicting approaches and
empirical findings within a comprehensive and unified information-theoretic formalism.
Keywords: Entropy; Uncertainty; Value of information; Information search; Probabilistic models
Correspondence should be sent to Vincenzo Crupi, Department of Philosophy and Education, University
of Turin, via Sant’Ottavio 20, 10124 Torino, Italy. E-mail: vincenzo.crupi@unito.it
1. Introduction
A key topic in the study of rationality, cognition, and behavior is the effective search
for relevant information or evidence. Information search is also closely connected to the
notion of uncertainty. Typically, an agent will seek to acquire information to reduce
uncertainty about an inference or decision problem. Physicians prescribe medical tests in
order to handle arrays of possible diagnoses. Detectives seek witnesses in order to iden-
tify the culprit of a crime. And, of course, scientists gather data in order to discriminate
among different hypotheses.
In psychology and cognitive science, most early work on information acquisition
adopted a logical, deductive inference perspective. In the spirit of Popper’s (1959) influ-
ential falsificationist philosophy of science, the idea was that learners should seek infor-
mation that could help them falsify hypotheses (e.g., expressed as a conditional or a rule;
Wason, 1960, 1966, 1968). However, many human reasoners did not seem to believe that
information is useful if and only if it can potentially rule out (falsify) a hypothesis. From
the 1980s, cognitive scientists started analyzing human information search with a closer
look at inductive inference, using probabilistic models to quantify the value of informa-
tion and endorsing them as normative benchmarks (e.g., Baron, 1985; Klayman & Ha,
1987; Skov & Sherman, 1986; Slowiaczek, Klayman, Sherman, & Skov, 1992; Trope &
Bassok, 1982, 1983). This research was inspired by seminal work in philosophy of
science (e.g. Good, 1950), statistics (e.g., Lindley, 1956), and decision theory (Savage,
1972). In this view, each outcome of a query could modify an agent’s beliefs about the
hypotheses being considered, thus providing some amount of information. For instance,
the key theoretical point of Oaksford and Chater’s (1994, 2003) analysis of Wason’s
selection task was to conceptualize information acquisition as a piece of probabilistic
inductive reasoning, assuming that people’s goal is to reduce uncertainty about whether a
rule holds or not. In a similar vein, researchers in vision science have used measures of
uncertainty reduction to predict visual queries for gathering information (i.e., eye move-
ments; Legge, Klitz, & Tjan, 1997; Najemnik & Geisler, 2005, 2009; Nelson & Cottrell,
2007; Renninger, Coughlan, Verghese, & Malik, 2005), or to guide a robot’s eye move-
ments (Denzler & Brown, 2002). Probabilistic models of uncertainty reduction have also
been used to predict human query selection in causal reasoning (Bramley, Lagnado, &
Speekenbrink, 2015), hypothesis testing (Austerweil & Griffiths, 2011; Navarro & Per-
fors, 2011; Nelson, Divjak, Gudmundsdottir, Martignon, & Meder, 2014; Nelson, Tenen-
baum, & Movellan, 2001), and categorization (Meder & Nelson, 2012; Nelson,
McKenzie, Cottrell, & Sejnowski, 2010).
If reducing uncertainty is a major cognitive goal and motivation for information acqui-
sition, a critical issue is how uncertainty and the reduction thereof can be represented in
a rigorous manner. A fruitful approach to formalize uncertainty is using the mathematical
notion of entropy, which in turn generates a corresponding model of the informational
utility of an experiment as the expected reduction of entropy (uncertainty), sometimes
called expected information gain.
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In many disciplines, including psychology and neuroscience (Hasson, 2016), the most
prominent model is Shannon (1948) entropy. However, a number of non-equivalent mea-
sures of entropy have been suggested, and are being used, in a variety of research
domains. Examples include the application of quadratic entropy in ecology (Lande,
1996), the family of Renyi (1961) entropies in computer science and image processing
(Boztas, 2014; Sahoo & Arora, 2004), and Tsallis entropies in physics (Tsallis, 2011). It
is currently unknown whether these other entropy models would have potential to address
key theoretical and empirical questions in cognitive science. Here, we bring together
these different models in a comprehensive theoretical framework, the Sharma–Mittal for-
malism (from Sharma & Mittal, 1975), which incorporates a large number of prominent
entropy measures as special cases. Careful consideration of the formal properties of this
family of entropy measures will reveal important implications for modeling uncertainty
and information search behavior. Against this rich theoretical background, we will draw
on existing behavioral data and novel simulations to explore how different models relate
to each other, elucidate their psychological meaning and plausibility, and show how they
can generate new testable predictions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We begin by spelling out what an
entropy measure is and how it can be employed to represent uncertainty and the informa-
tional value of queries (questions, tests, experiments) (Section 2). Subsequently, we
review four representative and influential definitions of entropy, namely Quadratic, Hart-
ley, Shannon, and Error entropy (Section 3). These models have been, and continue to
be, of importance in different areas of research. In the main theoretical section of the
paper, we describe a unified formal framework generating a biparametric continuum of
entropy measures. Drawing on work in generalized information theory, we show that
many extant models of entropy and expected entropy reduction can be embedded in this
comprehensive formalism (Section 4). We provide a number of new mathematical results
in this section. We also address the theoretical meaning of the parameters involved when
the target domain of application is human reasoning, with implications for both normative
and descriptive approaches. We then further elaborate on the connection with experimen-
tal research in several ways (Section 5). First, we present simulation results from an
extensive exploration of information search decision problems in which alternative mod-
els provide strongly diverging, empirically testable predictions (Section 5.1.). Second, we
report and discuss an overarching analysis of the information-theoretic account of the
most widely known experimental paradigm for the study of information gathering, i.e.,
Wason’s (1966, 1968) abstract selection task (Section 5.2.). Then we investigate which
models perform better against data from a range of experience-based studies on human
information search behavior (Meder & Nelson, 2012; Nelson et al., 2010) (Section 5.3.).
We also point out that some entropy models from this framework offer potential explana-
tion of human information search behavior in experiments where probabilities are con-
veyed through words and numbers, which to date have been perplexing to account for
theoretically (Section 5.4). Finally, we show that new models offer a theoretically satisfy-
ing and descriptively adequate unification of disparate results across different kinds of
tasks (Section 5.5.). In the General Discussion (Section 6.), we outline and assess the
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prospects of a generalized information-theoretic framework for guiding the study of
human inference and decision making.
Part of our discussion relies and elaborates on mathematical analyses, including novel
results. Moreover, although a number of the mathematical points in the paper can be found
scattered through the mathematics and physics literature, here we bring them together sys-
tematically. We provide Supplementary Materials where non-trivial derivations are given
according to our unified notation. Throughout each section of the text, statements requiring
a mathematical proof are flagged by brackets (Supplementary Material S1), and the proof
is then presented in the corresponding subsection of the Supplementary Materials file.
Among the formal results provided that are novel to the best of our knowledge, the follow-
ing we find especially important: the ordinal equivalence of Sharma–Mittal entropy mea-
sures of the same order (proof in Supplementary Material S1, section 4), the additivity of
all Sharma–Mittal measures of expected entropy reduction for sequential tests (again Sup-
plementary Material S1, section 4), and the distinctive role of the degree parameter in
information search tasks such as the Person Game (Supplementary Material S1, section 5).
Further novel results include the subsumption of diverse models such as the Arimoto
(1971) and the Power entropies within the Sharma–Mittal framework (Supplementary
Material S1, section 3), and the specification of how a number of different entropy mea-
sures can be construed within the general theory of means (Table 2).
2. Entropies, uncertainty, and information search
According to a well-known anecdote, the origins of information theory were marked
by a witty joke of John von Neumann. Claude Shannon was doubtful how to call the key
concept of his groundbreaking work on the “mathematical theory of communication”
(Shannon, 1948). “You should call it entropy,” von Neumann suggested. Of course, von
Neumann must have been aware of the close connections between Shannon’s formula
and Boltzmann’s definition of entropy in classical statistical mechanics. But the most
important reason for his suggestion, von Neumann quipped, was that “nobody knows
what entropy really is, so in a debate you will always have the advantage” (see Tribus &
McIrvine, 1971). Shannon accepted the advice. Several decades later, von Neumann’s
remark seems even more pointed, if anything. Influential observers have voiced caution
and concern about the proliferation of mathematical analyses of entropy and related
notions (Aczel, 1984, 1987). Meanwhile, many applications have been developed, for
instance in physics and ecology (see, e.g., Beck, 2009; Keylock, 2005). But recurrent the-
oretical controversies have arisen, too, along with occasional complaints of conceptual
confusion (see Cho, 2002; and Jost, 2006, respectively).
Luckily, these thorny issues will be tangential to our main concerns. Although a given
formalization of entropy can be considered for the representation and measurement of dif-
ferent constructs in each of a variety of domains, we focus on one target concept for
which entropies can be employed, namely the uncertainty concerning a variable X given
a probability distribution P. In this regard, the key question is the following: How much
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uncertainty is conveyed about variable X by a given probability distribution P? This
notion is central to the normative and descriptive study of human cognition.
Suppose, for instance, that an infection can be caused by three different types of virus,
and label x1, x2, x3 the corresponding possibilities. Consider two different probability
assignments, such as, say:
Pðx1Þ ¼ 0:49;Pðx2Þ ¼ 0:49;Pðx3Þ ¼ 0:02
and
Pðx1Þ ¼ 0:70;Pðx2Þ ¼ 0:15;Pðx3Þ ¼ 0:15
Is the uncertainty about X = {x1, x2, x3} greater under P or under P*? An entropy
measure enables us to give precise quantitative values in both case, and hence a clear
answer. Importantly, however, the answer will often be measure-dependent, for different
entropy measures convey different ideas of uncertainty and exhibit distinct mathematical
properties of theoretical interest. We will see this in detail later on.
Once uncertainty as our conceptual target has been outlined, we can turn to entropy as
a mathematical object. Consider a finite set X of n mutually exclusive and jointly exhaus-
tive possibilities x1, . . ., xn on which a probability distribution P(X) is defined, so that
P(X) = {P(x1), . . ., P(xn)}, with P(xi) ≥ 0 for any i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and
P
xi2X
PðxiÞ ¼ 1. The n
elements in X = {x1, . . ., xn} can be taken as representing different kinds of entities, such
as events, categories, or propositions. For our purposes, ent is an entropy measure if it is
a function f of the relevant probability values only, i.e.:
entP Xð Þ ¼ f P x1ð Þ; . . .;P xnð Þ½ 
and function f satisfies a small number of basic properties (see below). Notice that, in
general, an entropy function can be readily extended to the case of a conditional probabil-
ity distribution given some datum y. In fact, under the conditional probability distribution
P(X|y), one has entP Xjyð Þ ¼ f P x1jyð Þ; . . .;P xnjyð Þ½ .
Shannon entropy has been so prominent in cognitive science that some readers will
ask: why we do not just stick with it? More specific objections in this vein include that
Shannon entropy is uniquely axiomatically motivated, that Shannon entropy is already
central to psychological theory of the value of information, or that Shannon entropy is
optimal in certain applied situations. Each objection can be addressed separately. First, a
number of entropy metrics in our generalized framework (not only Shannon) have been
or can be uniquely derived from specific sets of axioms (see Csizar, 2008). Second,
although Shannon entropy has a number intuitively desirable properties, it is not a serious
competitive descriptive psychological model of the value of information in some tasks
(e.g., Nelson et al., 2010). Third, several published papers in applied domains report
superior performance when other entropy measures are used (e.g., Ramırez-Reyes,
Hernandez-Montoya, Herrera-Corral, & Domınguez-Jimenez, 2016). Indeed, Shannon’s
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(1948) own view was that although axiomatic characterization can lend plausibility to
measures of entropy and information, “the real justification” (p. 393) rests on the mea-
sures’ operational relevance. A generalized mathematical framework can increase our the-
oretical understanding of the relationships among different measures, unify diverse
psychological findings, and generate novel questions for future research.
Scholars have used different properties as defining an entropy measure (see, e.g.,
Csizar, 2008). Besides some usual technical requirement (like non-negativity), a key idea
is that entropy should be appropriately sensitive to how even or uneven a distribution is,
at least with respect to the extreme cases of an uniform probability function, U(X) = {1/n,
. . ., 1/n}, or of a deterministic function V(X) where V(xi) = 1 for some i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and
0 for all other xs. (In the latter case, the distribution actually reflects a truth-value assign-
ment, in logical parlance.) In our setting, U(X) represents the highest possible degree of
uncertainty about X, while under V(X) the true value of X is known for sure, and no
uncertainty is left. Hence it must hold that, for any X and P(X),
entU Xð Þ entP Xð Þ entV Xð Þ, with at least one inequality strict. This basic and minimal
condition we label evenness sensitivity. It is conveyed by Shannon entropy as well as
many others, as we shall see, and it guarantees, for instance, that entropy is strictly higher
for, say, a distribution like {1/3, 1/3, 1/3} than for {1,0,0}.
Once the idea of an entropy measure is characterized, one can study different measures
of expected entropy reduction. This amounts to considering two variables X and Y, and
defining the expected reduction of the initial entropy of X across the elements of Y. To
illustrate, in the viral infection example mentioned above, X may concern the type of
virus actually involved, while Y could be some clinically observable marker (like the
result of a blood test) which is informationally relevant for X. Mathematically, given a
joint probability distribution P(X,Y) over the combination of two variables X and Y (i.e.,
their Cartesian product X 9 Y), the actual change in entropy about X determined by an
element y in Y can be represented as DentP X; yð Þ ¼ entP Xð Þ  entP Xjyð Þ. Accordingly, the
expected reduction of the initial entropy of X across the elements of Y can be computed
in a standard way, as follows:1
RP X;Yð Þ ¼
X
yj2Y
DentP X; yj
 
PðyjÞ
The notation RP X;Yð Þ is adapted from work on the foundations of Bayesian statistics,
where the expected reduction in entropy is seen as measuring the dependence of variable
X on variable Y, or of the relevance of Y for X (see, e.g., Dawid & Musio, 2014).
Very much as for entropy itself, the expected reduction of entropy remains as gen-
eral and neutral a notion as possible. R measures, too, can be given different interpreta-
tions in different domains. In many contexts, it is plausibly assumed that reduction of
the uncertainty is a major dimension of the purely informational (or epistemic) value of
the search for more data. We will thus consider a measure R as providing a formal
approach to questions of the following kind: Given X as a target of investigation, what
is the expected usefulness of finding out about Y from a purely informational point of
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view? Hence, the notion of uncertainty is tightly coupled to the rational assessment of
the expected informational utility of pursuing a given search for additional evidence
(performing a query, executing a test, running an experiment). (See Crupi & Tentori,
2014; Nelson, 2005, 2008. For more discussion, also see Evans & Over, 1996; Roche
& Shogenji, 2016.)
Formally, X and Y can just be seen as partitions of possibilities. In this interpretation,
however, they play quite different roles in RP X;Yð Þ. The first argument, X, represents the
overall goal of the inquiry, while the second, Y, is supposed to be directly accessible to the
information seeker. In a typical application, Y will be more or less useful a test to learn
about target X, although unable to conclusively establish what the true hypothesis in X is.
In general, the occurrence of one particular element y of Y does not need to reduce the
initial entropy about X; it might as much increase it, hence making DentP X; yð Þ negative.
This quantity can be negative if (for instance) datum y changes probabilities from
P(X) = {0.9, 0.1} to P(X|y) = {0.6, 0.4}. But can RP X; Yð Þ, i.e., the expected informa-
tional usefulness of Y for learning about X, be negative? Some R measures are strictly
non-negative, but others can in fact be negative in the expectation; this depends on key
properties of the underlying entropy measure, as we discuss later on.
To summarize, in the domain of human cognition, probability distributions can be
employed to represent an agent’s degrees of belief (be they based on objective statistical
information or subjective confidence), with entropy entP Xð Þ providing a formalization of
the uncertainty about X (given P). Relying on the reduction of uncertainty as an informa-
tional utility, RP X; Yð Þ is then interpreted as a measure of the expected usefulness of a
query (test, experiment) Y relative to a target hypothesis space X. From now on, to
emphasize this interpretation, we will often use H = {h1, . . ., hn} to denote a hypothesis
set of interest and E = {e1, . . ., em} for a possible search for evidence. Table 1 summa-
rizes our terminology in this respect as well as for the subsequent sections.
3. Four influential entropy models
We will now briefly review four important models of entropy and the corresponding
models of expected entropy reduction.
3.1. Quadratic entropy
Entropy/Uncertainty Some interesting entropy measures were originally proposed long
before the exchange between Shannon and von Neumann, when entropy was not yet a
scientific term outside statistical thermodynamics. Here is one major instance:
entQuadP Hð Þ ¼ 1
X
hi2H
PðhiÞ2
Labeled Quadratic entropy in Vajda and Zvarova (2007), this measure is widely known
as the Gini (or Gini-Simpson) index, after Gini (1912) and Simpson (1949) (also see Gibbs
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& Martin, 1962). It is often employed as an index of biological diversity (see, e.g., Patil &
Taille, 1982) and sometimes spelled out in the following equivalent formulation:
entQuadP Hð Þ ¼
X
hi2H
PðhiÞ 1 PðhiÞð Þ
The above formula suggests a meaningful interpretation with H amounting to a parti-
tion of hypotheses considered by an uncertain agent. In this reading, entQuad computes the
average (expected) surprise that the agent would experience in finding out what the true
element of H is, given 1  P(h) as a measure of the surprise that arises in case h obtains
(see Crupi & Tentori, 2014).2
Entropy reduction/Informational value of queries Quadratic entropy reduction, namely,
DentQuadP H; eð Þ ¼ entQuadP Hð Þ  entQuadP Hjeð Þ, has been occasionally mentioned in
Table 1
Notation employed
Notation Description
H = {h1, . . ., hn} A partition of n possibilities (or hypothesis space)
P(H) Probability distribution P defined over the elements of H
P(H|e) Probability distribution P defined over the elements of H conditional on e
U(H) Uniform probability distribution over the elements of H
V(H) A probability distribution such that V(hi) = 1 for some i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and 0 for all other hs
H 9 E The variable obtained by the combination (Cartesian product) of variables H and E
P(H,E) Joint probability distribution over the combination of variables H and E
H ⊥P E Given P(H,E), variables H and E are statistically independent
H ?P EjF Given P(H,E,F), variables H and E are statistically independent conditional on each
element in F
entP Hð Þ Entropy of H given P(H)
entP Hjeð Þ Conditional entropy of H on e given P(H|e)
DentP H; eð Þ Reduction of the initial entropy of H provided by e, i.e., entP Hð Þ  entP Hjeð Þ
RP(H,E) Expected reduction of the entropy of H across the elements of E, given P(H,E)
RP(H,E| f) Expected reduction of the entropy of H across the elements of E, given P(H,E| f)
RP(H,E|F) Expected value of RP(H, E| f) across the elements of F, given P(H,E,F)
lnt(x) The Tsallis generalization of the natural logarithm (with parameter t)
et(x) The Tsallis generalization of the ordinary exponential (with parameter t)
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philosophical analyses of scientific inference (Niiniluoto & Tuomela, 1973, p. 67). In
turn, its associated expected reduction measure, RQuadP H;Eð Þ ¼
P
ej2E
DentQuadP H; ej
 
PðejÞ,
was applied by Horwich (1982, pp. 127–129), again in formal philosophy of science, and
studied in computer science by Raileanu and Stoffel (2004).
3.2. Hartley entropy
Entropy/Uncertainty Gini’s work did not play any apparent role in the development of
Shannon’s (1948) theory. A seminal paper by Hartley (1928), however, was a starting
point for Shannon’s analysis. One lasting insight of Hartley was the introduction of loga-
rithmic functions, which have become ubiquitous in information theory ever since. As
Hartley also realized, the choice of a base for the logarithm is a matter of conventionally
setting a unit of measurement (Hartley, 1928, pp. 539–541). Throughout our discussion,
we will employ the natural logarithm, denoted as ln.
Inspired by Hartley’s (1928) original idea that the information provided by the obser-
vation of one among n possible values of a variable is increasingly informative the larger
n is, and that it immediately reflects the entropy of that variable, one can define the Hart-
ley entropy as follows (Aczel, Forte, & Ng, 1974):
entHartleyP Hð Þ ¼ ln
X
hi2H
PðhiÞ0
" #
Under the convention 00 = 0 (which is standard in the entropy literature), and given
that P(hi)
0 = 1 whenever P(hi) > 0, ent
Hartley computes the logarithm of the number of all
non-null probability elements in H.
Entropy reduction/Informational value of queries When applied to the domain of reason-
ing and cognition, the implications of Hartley entropy reveal an interesting Popperian fla-
vor. A piece of evidence e is useful, it turns out, only to the extent that it excludes
(“falsifies”) at least some of the hypotheses in H, for otherwise the reduction in Hartley
entropy, DentHartleyP H; eð Þ ¼ entHartleyP Hð Þ entHartleyP Hjeð Þ, is just zero. An agent adopting
such a measure of informational utility would then only value a test outcome, e, insofar
as it conclusively rules out at least one hypothesis in H. If no possible outcome in E is
potentially a “falsifier” for some hypothesis in H, then the expected reduction of Hartley
entropy, RHartley, is also zero, implying that query E has no expected usefulness at all
with respect to H.
3.3. Shannon entropy
Entropy/Uncertainty In many contexts, the notion of entropy is simply and immediately
equated to Shannon’s formalism. Overall, such special consideration is well-deserved and
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motivated by countless applications spread over virtually all branches of science. The
form of Shannon entropy is fairly well-known:
entShannonP Hð Þ ¼
X
hi2H
PðhiÞln 1
PðhiÞ
 
Concerning the interpretation of the formula, many points made earlier for quadratic
entropy apply to Shannon entropy too, given relevant adjustments. In fact, ln(1/P(h)) is
another measure of the surprise in finding out that a state of affairs h obtains, and thus
entShannon is its overall expected value relative to H.3
Entropy reduction/Informational value of queries The reduction of Shannon entropy,
DentShannonP H; eð Þ ¼ entShannonP Hð Þ  entShannonP Hjeð Þ, is sometimes called information gain
and it is often considered as a measure of the informational utility of a datum e. Its
expected value, also called expected information gain,
RShannonP H;Eð Þ ¼
P
ej2E
DentShannonP H; ej
 
PðejÞ, is then viewed as a measure of usefulness of
query E for learning about H. (See, e.g., Austerweil & Griffiths, 2011; Bar-Hillel & Car-
nap, 1953; Lindley, 1956; Oaksford & Chater, 1994, 2003; and Ruggeri & Lombrozo,
2015; also see Benish, 1999; and Nelson, 2005, 2008, for more discussion.)
3.4. Error entropy
Entropy/Uncertainty Given a distribution P(H) and the goal of predicting the true ele-
ment of H, a rational agent would plausibly select h* such that P(h*) = maxhi2H PðhiÞ½ ,
and 1 – maxhi2H PðhiÞ½  would then be the probability of error. Since Fano’s (1961) semi-
nal work, this quantity has received considerable attention in information theory. Also
known as Bayes’s error, we will call this quantity Error entropy:
entErrorP Hð Þ ¼ 1maxhi2H PðhiÞ½ 
Note that entError is only concerned with the largest value in the distribution P(H),
namely maxhi2H PðhiÞ½ . The lower that value, the higher the chance of error were a guess
to be made, thus the higher the uncertainty about H.
Entropy reduction/Informational value of queries Unlike the other models above, Error
entropy has seldom been considered in the natural or social sciences. However, it can be
taken as a sound basis for the analysis of rational behavior. In the latter domain, it is quite
natural to rely on the reduction of the expected probability of error
DentErrorP H; eð Þ ¼ entErrorP Hð Þ  entErrorP Hjeð Þ as the utility of a datum (often labeled proba-
bility gain; see Baron, 1985; Nelson, 2005, 2008) and on its expected value,
RErrorP H;Eð Þ ¼
P
ej2E
DentErrorP H; ej
 
PðejÞ, as the usefulness of a query or test. Indeed, there
are important occurrences of this model in the study of human cognition.4
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4. A unified framework for uncertainty and information search
The set of models introduced above represents a diverse sample in historical, theoret-
ical, and mathematical terms (see Fig. 1 for a graphical illustration). Is the prominence
of particular models due to fundamental distinctive properties, or largely due to historical
accident? What are the relationships among these models? In this section we show how
all of these models can be embedded in a unified mathematical formalism, providing
new insight.
4.1. Sharma–Mittal entropies
Let us take Shannon entropy again as a convenient starting point. As noted above,
Shannon entropy is an average, more precisely a self-weighted average, displaying the
following structure: X
hi2H
P hið Þinf P hið Þ½ 
The label self-weighted indicates that each probability P(h) serves as a weight for the
value of function inf having that same probability as its argument, namely, inf [P(h)]. The
function inf can be seen as capturing a notion of atomic information (or surprise),
Fig. 1. A graphical illustration of Quadratic, Hartley, Shannon, and Error entropy as distinct measures of
uncertainty over a binary hypothesis set H = {h,h} as a function of the probability of h.
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assigning a value to each distinct element of H on the basis of its own probability (and
nothing else). An obvious requirement here is that inf should be a decreasing function,
because a finding that was antecedently highly probable (improbable) provides little
(much) new information (an idea that Floridi, 2013, calls “inverse relationship principle”
after Barwise, 1997, p. 491). In Shannon entropy, one has inf(x) = ln(1/x). Given inf
(x) = 1  x, instead, Quadratic entropy arises from the very same scheme above.
A self-weighted average is a special case of a generalized (self-weighted) mean, which
can be characterized as follows:
g1
X
hi2H
P hið Þg inf P hið Þ½ f g
( )
where g is a differentiable and strictly increasing function (see Wang & Jiang, 2005; also
see Muliere & Parmigiani, 1993, for the fascinating history of these ideas). For different
choices of g, different kinds of (self-weighted) means are instantiated. With g(x) = x, the
weighted average above obtains once again. For another standard instance, g(x) = 1/x gives
rise to the harmonic mean. Let us now consider the form of generalized (self-weighted)
means above and focus on the following setting:
g xð Þ ¼ lnr et xð Þ½ 
inf xð Þ ¼ lnt 1=xð Þ
where
lnt xð Þ ¼ x
ð1tÞ  1
1 t
ext ¼ 1þ 1 tð Þx½ 
1
1t
are generalized versions of the natural logarithm and exponential functions, respectively,
often associated with Tsallis’s (1988) work. Importantly, the lnt function recovers the
ordinary natural logarithm ln in the limit for t ? 1, so that one can safely equate
lnt(x) = ln(x) for t = 1 and have a nice and smooth generalized logarithmic function.
5
Similarly, it is assumed that ext = e
x for t = 1, as this is the limit for t ? 1 (Supplemen-
tary Material S1, section 1). Negative values of parameters r and t will not need concern
us here: we’ll be assuming r,t ≥ 0 throughout.
Once fed into the generalized means equation, these specifications of inf(x) and g(x)
yield a two-parameter family of entropy measures of order r and degree t (Supplementary
Material S1, section 2):
ent
SMðr;tÞ
P Hð Þ ¼
1
t  1 1
X
hi2H
P hið Þr
 !t1
r1
2
4
3
5
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The label SM refers to Sharma and Mittal (1975), where this formalism was originally
proposed (also see Hoffmann, 2008; and Masi, 2005). All functions in the Sharma–Mittal
family are evenness sensitive (see 2. above), thus in line with a basic characterization of
entropies (Supplementary Material S1, section 2). Also, with entSMðr;tÞ one can embed the
whole set of four classic measures in our initial list. More precisely (Supplementary
Material S1, section 3):
- Quadratic entropy can be derived from the Sharma–Mittal family for r = t = 2, that
is, ent
SMð2;2Þ
P ðHÞ ¼ entQuadP Hð Þ;
- Hartley entropy can be derived from the Sharma–Mittal family for r = 0 and t = 1,
that is, ent
SMð0;1Þ
P ðHÞ ¼ entHartleyP Hð Þ;
- Shannon entropy can be derived from the Sharma–Mittal family for r = t = 1, that
is, ent
SMð1;1Þ
P ðHÞ ¼ entShannonP Hð Þ;
- Error entropy is recovered from the Sharma–Mittal family in the limit for r ? ∞
when t = 2, so that we have ent
SMð1;2Þ
P ðHÞ ¼ entErrorP Hð Þ.
A good deal more can be said about the scope of this approach: see Figs. 2 and 3, Table 2,
and Supplementary Material S1 (section 3) for additional material. Here, we will only men-
tion briefly three important further points about R-measures in the Sharma–Mittal framework
and their meaning for modeling information search behavior. They are as follows.
Additivity of expected entropy reduction For any H,E,F and P H;E;Fð Þ,
R
SM r;tð Þ
P H;E  Fð Þ ¼ R
SM r;tð Þ
P H;Eð Þ þ R
SM r;tð Þ
P H;FjEð Þ.
This statement means that, for any Sharma–Mittal R-measure, the informational utility of
a combined test E 9 F for H amounts to the sum of the plain utility of E and the utility of
F that is expected considering all possible outcomes of E (Supplementary Material S1, sec-
tion 4). (Formally, R
SM r;tð Þ
P H;FjEð Þ ¼
P
ej2E
R
SM r;tð Þ
P H;Fjej
 
P ej
 
, while R
SM r;tð Þ
P H;Fjej
 
denotes the expected entropy reduction of H provided by F as computed when all relevant
probabilities are conditionalized on ej.) According to Nelson’s (2008) discussion, this ele-
gant additivity property of expected entropy reduction is important and highly desirable as
concerns the analysis of the rational assessment of tests or queries. Moreover, one can see
that the additivity of expected entropy reduction can be extended to any finite chain of
queries and thus be applied to sequential search tasks such as those experimentally investi-
gated by Nelson et al. (2014).
Irrelevance For any H,E and P H;Eð Þ, if either E = {e} or H ⊥P E then
R
SM r;tð Þ
P H;Eð Þ ¼ 0.
This statement says that two special kinds of queries can be known in advance to be
of no use, that is, informationally inconsequential relative to the hypothesis set of interest.
One is the case of an empty test E = {e} with a single possibility that is already known
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to obtain with certainty, so that P(e) = 1. As suggested vividly by Floridi (2009, p. 26),
this would be like consulting the raven in Edgar Allan Poe’s famous poem, which is
known to give one and the same answer no matter what (it always spells out “Never-
more”). The other case is when variables H and E are unrelated, that is, statistically inde-
pendent according to P (H ⊥P E in our notation). In both of these circumstances,
R
SM r;tð Þ
P H;Eð Þ ¼ 0 simply because the prior and posterior distribution on H are identical
for each possible value of E, so that no entropy reduction can ever obtain.
By the irrelevance condition, empty and unrelated queries have zero expected utility
— but can a query E have a negative expected utility? If so, a rational agent would be
willing to pay a cost just for not being told what the true state of affairs is as concerns E,
Fig. 2. The Sharma–Mittal family of entropy measures is represented in a Cartesian quadrant with values of the
order parameter r and of the degree parameter t lying on the x– and y–axis, respectively. Each point in the quad-
rant corresponds to a specific entropy measure, each line corresponds to a distinct one-parameter generalized
entropy function. Several special cases are highlighted. (Relevant references and formulas are listed in Table 2).
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much as an abandoned lover who wants to be spared being told whether her/his beloved
is or is not happy because s/he expects more harm than good. Note, however, that for the
lover non-informational costs are clearly involved, while we are assuming queries or tests
to be assessed in purely informational terms, bracketing all further factors (for work
involving situation-specific payoffs, see, e.g., Raiffa & Schlaifer, 1961; Meder & Nelson,
2012; and Markant & Gureckis, 2012). In this perspective, it is reasonable and common
to see irrelevance as the worst-case scenario and exclude the possibility of information-
ally harmful tests: an irrelevant test (whether empty or statistically unrelated) simply can-
not tell us anything of interest, but that is as bad as it can get (for seminal analyses, see
Good, 1967, and Goosens, 1976; also see Dawid, 1998).6
Fig. 3. A graphical illustration of the generalized atomic information function lnt(1/P(h)) for four different
values of the parameter t (0, 1, 2, and 5, respectively, for the curves from top to bottom). Appropriately, the
amount of information arising from finding out that h is the case is a decreasing function of P(h). For high
values of t, however, such decrease is flattened: with t = 5 (the lowest curve in the figure) finding out that h
is true provides almost the same amount of information for a large set of initial probability assignments.
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Interestingly, not all Sharma–Mittal measures of expected entropy reduction are non-
negative. Some of them do allow for the controversial idea that there could exist detri-
mental tests in purely informational terms, such that an agent should rank them worse
than an irrelevant search and take active measures to avoid them (despite them having,
by assumption, no intrinsic cost). Mathematically, a non-negative measure RP H;Eð Þ is
generated if and only if the underlying entropy measure is a concave function (Supple-
mentary Material S1, section 4), and the conditions for concavity are as follows:
Concavity: ent
SM r;tð Þ
P ðHÞ is a concave function of {P(h1), . . ., P(hn)} just in case
t ≥ 2  1/r.7
In terms of Fig. 2, this means that any entropy (represented by a point) below the Ari-
moto curve is not generally concave (see Fig. 4 for a graphical illustration of a strongly
non-concave entropy measure). Thus, if the concavity of ent is required (to preserve the
non-negativity of R), then many prominent special cases are retained (including Quadra-
tic, Hartley, Shannon, and Error entropy), but a significant bit of the whole Sharma–Mit-
tal parameter space is ruled out. This concerns, for instance, entropies of degree 1 and
order higher than 1 (see Ben-Bassat & Raviv, 1978).
4.2. Psychological interpretation of the order and degree parameter
The order parameter r: Imbalance and continuity What is the meaning of the order
parameter in the Sharma–Mittal formalism when entropies and expected entropy reduc-
tion measures represent uncertainty and the value of queries, respectively? To clarify, let
us consider what happens with extreme values of r, i.e., if r = 0 or goes to infinity,
respectively (Supplementary Material S1, section 3):
ent
SMð0;tÞ
P Hð Þ ¼ lnt
X
hi2H
P hið Þ0
" #
ent
SM 1;tð Þ
P Hð Þ ¼ lnt
1
maxhi2H P hið Þ½ 
 	
Given the convention 00 = 0,
P
hi2H
P hið Þ0 simply computes the number of all elements
in H with a non-null probability. Accordingly, when r = 0, entropy becomes a (increas-
ing) function of the mere number of the “live” (non-zero probability) options in H. When
r goes to infinity, on the other hand, entropy becomes a (decreasing) function of the prob-
ability of a single element in H, i.e., the most likely hypothesis. This shows that the order
parameter r is an index of the imbalance of the entropy function, which indicates how
much the entropy measure discounts minor (low probability) hypotheses. For order-0
measures, the actual probability distribution is neglected: non-zero probability hypothesis
are just counted, as if they were all equally important (see Gauvrit & Morsanyi, 2014).
For order-∞ measures, on the other hand, only the most probable hypothesis matters, and
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all other hypotheses are disregarded altogether. For intermediate values of r, more likely
hypotheses count more, but less likely hypotheses do retain some weight. The higher
(lower) r is, the more (less) the likely hypotheses are regarded and the unlikely hypothe-
ses are discounted. Importantly, for extreme values of the order parameter, an otherwise
natural idea of continuity fails in the measurement of entropy: when r goes to either zero
or infinity, it is not the case that small (large) changes in the probability distribution P(H)
produce comparably small (large) changes in entropy values.
To see better how order-0 entropy measures behave, consider the simplest of them:
ent
SMð0;0Þ
P Hð Þ ¼ nþ  1
where nþ ¼ P
hi2H
P hið Þ0, so n+ denotes the number of hypotheses in H with a non-null
(strictly positive) probability. Given the 1 correction, entSMð0;0Þ can be interpreted as the
“number of contenders” for each entity in set H, because it takes value 0 when only one
element is left. For future reference, we will label entSMð0;0Þ Origin entropy because it
Fig. 4. Graphical illustration of the non-concave entropy entSMð20;0Þ for a binary hypothesis set H = {h,h} as a
function of the probability of h.
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marks the origin of the graph in Fig. 3. Importantly, the expected reduction of Origin
entropy is just the expected number of hypotheses in H conclusively falsified by a test E.
To the extent that all details of the prior and posterior probability distribution over H
are neglected, computational demands are significantly decreased with order-0 entropies.
As a consequence, measures of the expected reduction of an order-0 entropy (and espe-
cially Origin entropy) also amount to comparably frugal, heuristic or quasi-heuristic mod-
els of information search (see Baron et al.’s, 1988; p. 106). Lack of continuity, too, is
associated with heuristic models, which often rely on discrete elements instead of contin-
uous representations (see Gigerenzer, Hertwig, & Pachur, 2011; Katsikopoulos, Schooler,
& Hertwig, 2010). More generally, when the order parameter approaches 0, entropy mea-
sures become more and more balanced, meaning that they treat all live hypotheses more
and more equally. What happens to the associated expected entropy reduction measures
is that they become more and more “Popperian” in spirit. In fact, for order-0 relevance
measures, a test E will deliver some non-null expected informational utility about hypoth-
esis set H if and only if some of the possible outcomes of E can conclusively rule out
some element in H. Otherwise, the expected entropy reduction will be zero, no matter
how large the changes in probability that might arise from E. Cognitively, relevance mea-
sures of low order would then describe the information search preferences of an agent
who is distinctively eager to prune down the list of candidate hypotheses, an attitude
which might prevail in earlier stages of an inquiry, when such a list can be sizable.
Among entropy measures of order infinity, we already know entSMð1;2Þ ¼ 1
maxhi2H PðhiÞ½  as Error entropy. What this illustrates is that, when r goes to infinity,
entropy measures become more and more decision-theoretic in a short-sighted kind of
way: in the limit, they are only affected by the probability of a correct guess given the
currently available information. A notable consequence for the associated measures of
expected entropy reduction is that a test E can deliver some non-null expected informa-
tional utility only if some of the possible outcomes of E can alter the probability of the
modal hypothesis in H. If that is not the case, then the expected utility will be zero, no
matter how significant the changes in the probability distribution arising from E. Cogni-
tively, then, R-measures of very high order would describe the information search prefer-
ences of an agent who is predominantly concerned with an estimate of the probability of
error in an impending choice from set H.
4.2.2. The degree parameter t: Perfect tests and certainty Let us now consider briefly
the meaning of the degree parameter t in the Sharma–Mittal formalism when entropies
and relevance measures represent uncertainty and the value of queries, respectively. A
remarkable fact about the degree parameter t is that (unlike the order parameter r) it does
not affect the ranking of entropy values. Indeed, one can show that any Sharma–Mittal
entropy measure is a strictly increasing function of any other measure of the same order
r, regardless of the degree (for any hypothesis set H and any probability distribution P)
(Supplementary Material S1, section 4). Thus, concerning the ordinal comparison of
entropy values, only if the order differs can divergences between pairs of SM entropy
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measures arise. On the other hand, the implications of the degree parameter for measures
of expected entropy reduction are significant and have not received much attention.
As a useful basis for discussion, suppose that variables H and E are independent, in
the standard sense that for any hi 2 H and any ej 2 E, P(hi∩ej) = P(hi)P(ej), denoted as
H ⊥P E. Then we have (Supplementary Material S1, section 4):
R
SMðr;tÞ
P E;Eð Þ  R
SMðr;tÞ
P H  E;Eð Þ ¼ ðt  1Þent
SMðr;tÞ
P Hð Þent
SMðr;tÞ
P Eð Þ
If expected entropy reduction is interpreted as a measure of the informational utility of
queries or tests, this equality governs the relationship between the computed utilities of E
in case it is a “perfect” (conclusive) test and in case it is not. More precisely, the first
term on the left, R
SMðr;tÞ
P E;Eð Þ, measures the expected informational utility of a perfect test
because the test itself and the target of investigation are the same, hence finding out the
true value of E removes all relevant uncertainty. On the other hand, E is not anymore a
perfect test in the second term of the equation above, R
SMðr;tÞ
P H  E;Eð Þ, for here a more
fine-grained hypothesis set H 9 E is at issue, thus a more demanding epistemic target;
hence finding out the true value of E would not remove all relevant uncertainty. (Recall
that, by assumption, H is statistically independent from E, so the uncertainty about H
would remain untouched, as it were, after knowing about E.). With entropies of degree 1
(including Shannon), the associated measures of expected entropy reduction imply that E
has exactly identical utility in both cases, because t = 1 nullifies the right-hand side of
the equation, regardless of the order parameter r. With t > 1 the right-hand side is posi-
tive, so E is a strictly more useful test when it is conclusive than when it is not. With
t < 1, on the contrary, the right-hand side is negative, so E is strictly less useful a test
when it is conclusive than when it is not. Note that these are ordinal relationships (rank-
ings). In comparing the expected informational utility of queries, the degree parameter t
can thus play a crucial role. Crupi and Tentori (2014, p. 88) provided some simple
illustrations which can be adapted as favoring an entropy with t > 1 as the basis for
the R-measure of the expected utility of queries (here, we present an illustration in
Fig. 5).
The meaning of a high degree parameter is of particular interest in so-called Tsallis
family of entropy measures, obtained from entSMðr;tÞ when r = t (see Table 2). Consider
Tsallis entropy of degree 30, that is entSMð30;30Þ . With this measure, entropy remains very
close to a upper bound value of 1/(t  1)  0.0345 unless the probability distribution
reflects near-certainty about the true element in the hypothesis set H. For instance, for as
uneven a distribution as {0.90, 0.05, 0.05}, entTsallisð30Þ yields entropy 0.03330, still close
to 0.0345, while it quickly approaches 0 when the probability of one hypothesis exceeds
0.99. Non-certainty entropy seems a useful label for future reference, as measure
entTsallisð30Þ essentially implies that entropy is almost invariant as long as an appreciable
lack of certainty (a “reasonable doubt”, as it were) endures. Accordingly, the entropy
reduction from a piece of evidence e is largely negligible unless one is led to acquire a
very high degree of certainty about H, and it approaches the upper bound of 1/(t  1) as
the posterior probability comes close to matching a truth-value assignment (with P
1430 Vincenzo Crupi et al. / Cognitive Science 42 (2018)
(hi) = 1 for some i and 0 for all other hs). Up to the inconsequential normalizing constant
t  1, the expected reduction of this entropy, RTsallisð30Þ , amounts to a smooth variant of
Nelson et al.’s (2010) “probability-of-certainty heuristic”, where a datum ei 2 E has
informational utility 1 if it reveals the true element in H with certainty and utility 0 other-
wise, so that the expected utility of E itself is just the overall probability that certainty
about H is eventually achieved by that test. These remarks further illustrate that a larger
degree t implies an increasing tendency of the corresponding R-measure to value highly
the attainment of certainty or quasi-certainty about the target hypothesis set when assess-
ing a test.
Fig. 5. Consider a standard 52-card playing deck, with Suit corresponding to the four equally probable suits,
Value corresponding to the 13 equally probable numbers (or faces) that a card can take (2 through 10, Jack,
Queen, King, Ace), and Suit✕Value corresponding to the 52 equally probable individual cards in the deck.
Suppose that you will be told the suit of a randomly chosen card. Is this more valuable to you if (i) (perfect test
case) your goal is to learn the suit, i.e., RP(Suit, Suit), or (ii) (inconclusive test case) your goal is to learn the
specific card, i.e., RP(Suit✕Value, Suit)? What is the ratio of the value of the expected entropy reduction in (i)
versus (ii)? For degree 1, the information to be obtained has equal value in each case. For degrees > 1, the per-
fect test is more useful. For degrees < 1, the inconclusive test is more useful. Interestingly, as the figure shows,
the degree parameter uniquely determines the relative value of RP(Suit, Suit) and RP(Suit ✕ Value, Suit),
regardless of the order parameter. In the Figure, values of the order parameter r and of the degree parameter t
lie on the x– and y–axis, respectively. Color represents the log of the ratio between the conclusive test and the
inconclusive test case in the card example above: black means that the information values of the tests are equal
(log of the ratio is 0); warm/cool shades indicate that the conclusive test has a higher/lower value, respectively
(log of the ratio is positive/negative).
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5. A systematic exploration of how key information search models diverge
Depending on different entropy functions, two measures R and R* of the expected
reduction of entropy as the informational utility of tests may disagree in their rankings.
Formally, there exist variables H, E, and F and probability distribution P(H,E,F) such that
RP H;Eð Þ[RP H;Fð Þ while RP H;Eð Þ\RP H;Fð Þ; thus, R-measures are not generally or-
dinally equivalent. In the following, we will focus on an illustrative sample of measures
in the Sharma–Mittal framework and show that such divergences can be widespread,
strong, and telling about the specific tenets of those measures. This means that different
entropy measures can provide markedly divergent implications in the assessment of possi-
ble queries’ expected usefulness. Depending on the interpretation of the models, this in turn
implies conflicting empirical predictions and/or incompatible normative recommendations.
Our list will include three classical models that are standard at least in some domains,
namely Shannon, Quadratic, and Error entropy. It also includes three measures which we
previously labeled heuristic or quasi-heuristic in that they largely or completely disregard
quantitative information conveyed by the relevant probability distribution P: these are
Origin entropy (or the “number of contenders”), Hartley entropy, and Non-certainty
entropy, as defined above. For a wider coverage and comparison, we also include an
entropy function lying well below the Arimoto curve in Fig. 2, that is, entSMð20;0Þ , and thus
labeled Non-concave (see Fig. 4).
We ran simulations to identify cases of strong disagreement between our seven mea-
sures of expected entropy reduction, on a pairwise basis, about which of two tests is
taken to be more useful. In each simulation, we considered a scenario with a threefold
hypothesis space H = {h1, h2, h3}, and two binary tests, E = {e,e} and F = {f,f }.
8 The
goal of each simulation was to find a case — that is, a specific joint probability distribu-
tion P(H,E,F) — where two R-measures strongly disagree about which of two tests is
most useful. The ideal scenario here is a case where expected reduction of one kind of
entropy (say, Origin) implies that E is as useful as can possibly be found, while F is as
bad as it can be, and the expected reduction of another kind of entropy (say, Shannon)
implies the opposite, with equal strength of conviction.
The quantification of the disagreement between two R-measures in a given case — for
a given P(H,E,F) — arises from three steps (also see Nelson et al., 2010). (i) Normaliza-
tion: for each measure, we divide nominal values of expected entropy reduction (for each
of E and F) by the expected entropy reduction of a conclusive test for three equally prob-
able hypotheses, that is, by RU H;Hð Þ. (ii) Preference Strength: for each measure, we
compute the simple difference between the (normalized) expected entropy reduction for
test E and for test F, that is, RP H;Eð ÞRU H;Hð Þ 
RP H;Fð Þ
RU H;Hð Þ. (iii) Disagreement Strength (DS): if the
two measures agree on whether E or F is most useful, DS is defined as zero; if they dis-
agree, DS is defined as the geometric mean of those measures’ respective absolute prefer-
ence strengths in step (ii).
In the simulations, a variety of techniques were involved in order to maximize dis-
agreement strength, including random generation of prior probabilities over H and of
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likelihoods for E and F, optimization of likelihoods alone, and joint optimization of like-
lihoods and priors. Each example reported here was found in the attempt to maximize DS
for a particular pair of measures. We relied on the simulations largely as a heuristic tool,
thus selecting and slightly adapting the numerical examples to make them more intuitive
and improve clarity.9
For each pair of R-measures in our sample of seven, at least one case of moderate or
strong disagreement was found (Table 3). Thus, for each pairwise comparison one can
identify probabilities for which the models make diverging claims about which test is
more useful. In what follows, we append a short discussion to the cases in which Shan-
non entropy strongly disagrees with each competing model. Such discussion is illustrative
and qualitative, to intuitively highlight the underlying properties of different models. Sim-
ilar explications could be provided for all other pairwise comparisons, but are omitted for
the sake of brevity.
Shannon versus Non-certainty Entropy (case 3 in Table 3; DS = 0.30). In its purest form,
Non-certainty entropy equals 0 if one hypothesis in H is known to be true with certainty,
and 1 otherwise. As a consequence, the entropy reduction expected from a test E just
amounts to the probability that full certainty will be achieved after E is performed.
Within the Sharma–Mittal framework, this behavior can be often approximated by an
entropy measure such as Tsallis of degree 30, as explained above.10 One example where
the expected reduction of Shannon and Non-certainty entropy disagree significantly
involves a prior P(H) = {0.67, 0.10, 0.23}. The Non-certainty measure rates very poorly
a test E such that P(H|e) = {0.899, 0.100, 0.001}, P(H|e) = {0.001, 0.100, 0.899}, and P
(e) = 0.74, and strongly prefers a test F such that P(H|f) = {1, 0, 0}, P(H|f ) = {0.40,
0.18, 0.42}, and P(f) = 0.45, because the probability to attain full certainty from F is siz-
able (45%). The expected reduction of Shannon entropy implies the opposite ranking,
because test E, while unable to provide full certainty, will invariably yield a highly
skewed posterior as compared to the prior.
Shannon versus Origin and Hartley Entropy (case 5 in Table 3; DS = 0.56 and
DS = 0.48, respectively). The reduction of both Origin and Hartley entropy share similar
ideas of counting how many hypotheses are conclusively ruled out by the evidence. For
example, with prior P(H) = {0.500, 0.499, 0.001}, the expected reduction of either Origin
or Hartley entropy assigns value zero to test E such that P(H|e) = {0.998, 0.001, 0.001},
P(H|e) = {0.001, 0.998, 0.001}, and P(e) = 0.501, because no hypothesis is ever ruled
out conclusively, and rather prefers test F such that P(H|f) = {0.501, 0.499, 0},
P(H|f ) = {0, 0.499, 0.501}, and P(f) = 0.998. The expected reduction of Shannon entropy
implies the opposite ranking, because F will almost always yield only a tiny change in
overall uncertainty.
Shannon versus Non-concave Entropy (case 6 in Table 3; DS = 0.26). For non-concave
entropies, the expected entropy reduction may turn out to be negative, thus indicating an
allegedly detrimental query, that is, a test where expected utility is lower than that of a
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completely irrelevant test. This feature yields cases of significant disagreement between
the expected reduction of our illustrative non-concave entropy, entSMð20;0Þ , and of classical
concave measures such as Shannon. With a prior P(H) = {0.66, 0.17, 0.17}, the non-con-
cave measure rates a test E such that P(H|e) = {1, 0, 0},
P(H|e) = {1/3, 1/3, 1/3}, and P(e) = 0.49 much lower than an irrelevant test F such that
P(H|f) = P(H|f ) = P(H). Indeed, the non-concave R-measure assigns a significant negative
value to test E. This critically depends on one interesting fact: for non-concave entropy,
going from P(H) to a completely flat posterior, P(H|e), is an extremely aversive outcome
(i.e. it implies a very large increase in uncertainty), while the 49% chance of achieving
certainty by datum e is not highly valued (a feature of low degree measures, as we
know). The expected reduction of Shannon entropy implies the opposite ranking instead,
as it conveys the principle that no test can be informationally less useful than an irrele-
vant test (such as F).
Shannon versus Quadratic Entropy (case 8 in Table 3; DS = 0.09). Shannon and Quadra-
tic entropies are similar in many ways, yet at least cases of moderate disagreement can
be found. One is with prior P(H) = {0.50, 0.14, 0.36}. Test E is such that P(H|
e) = {0.72, 0.14, 0.14}, P(H|) = {0.14, 0.14, 0.72}, and P(e) = 0.62, while with test F
one has P(H| f) = {0.5, 0.5, 0}, P(H| f ) = {0.5, 0, 0.5}, and P(f) = 0.28. Expected Quad-
ratic entropy reduction ranks E over F, as it puts a particularly high value on posterior
distributions where one single hypothesis comes to prevail. In comparison, this is less
important for the reduction of Shannon entropy, as long as some hypotheses are com-
pletely (or largely) ruled out, as occurs with F. Accordingly, the Shannon measure prefers
F over E.
Shannon versus Error Entropy (case 9 in Table 3; DS = 0.20). A stronger disagreement
arises between Shannon and Error entropy. Consider prior P(H) = {0.50, 0.18, 0.32}, a
test E such that P(H|e) = {0.65, 0.18, 0.17}, P(H|e) = {0.17, 0.18, 0.65}, and P(e) = 0.69,
and a test F such that P(H| f) = {0.5, 0.5, 0}, P(H| f ) = {0.5, 0, 0.5}, and P(f) = 0.36. The
expected reduction of Error entropy is significant with E but zero with F, because the latter
will leave the modal probability untouched. (Note that it does not matter that the hypothe-
ses with the maximum probability changed.) However, test F, unlike E, will invariably rule
out an hypothesis that was a priori significantly probable, and for this reason is preferred
by the Shannon R-measure.
6. Model comparison: Prediction and behavior
Now that we have seen examples illustrating the theoretical properties of a variety
of Sharma–Mittal relevance measures, we turn to addressing whether the Sharma–
Mittal measures can help with psychological or normative theory of the value of
information.
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6.1. Comprehensive analysis of Wason’s abstract selection task
The single most widely studied experimental information search paradigm is Wason’s
(1966) selection task. In the classical, abstract version, participants are presented with a
conditional hypothesis (or “rule”), h = “if A (antecedent), then C (consequent)”. The
hypothesis concerns some cards, each of which has a letter on one side and a number on
the other, for instance A = “the card has a vowel on one side” and C = “the card has an
even number on the other side”. One side is displayed for each of four cards: one instan-
tiating A (e.g., showing letter E), one instantiating not-A (e.g., showing letter K), one
instantiating C (e.g., showing number 4), and one instantiating not-C (e.g., showing num-
ber 7). Participants have therefore four information search options in order to assess the
truth or falsity of hypothesis h: turning over the A, the not-A, the C, or the not-C card.
They are asked to choose which ones they would pick up as useful to establish whether
the hypothesis holds or not. All, none, or any subset of the four cards can be selected.
According to Wason’s (1966) original “Popperian” reading of the task, the A and not-
C search options are useful because they could falsify h (by possibly revealing a even
number and a vowel, respectively), so a rational agent should select them. The not-A and
C options, on the contrary, could not provide conclusively refuting evidence, so they’re
worthless in this interpretation. However, observed choice frequencies depart markedly
from these prescriptions. In Oaksford and Chater’s (1994, p. 613) metaanalysis, they were
89%, 16%, 62%, and 25% for A, not-A, C, and not-C, respectively. Oaksford and Chater
(1994, 2003) devised Bayesian models of the task in which agents treat the four cards as
sampled from a larger deck and are assumed to maximize the expected reduction of
uncertainty, with Shannon entropy as the standard measure. Oaksford and Chater postu-
lated a foil hypothesis h in which A and C are statistically independent and a target
hypothesis h under which C always (or almost always) follows A. In Oaksford and Cha-
ter’s (1994) “deterministic” analysis, C always followed A under the dependence hypothe-
sis h. A key innovation in Oaksford and Chater (2003, p. 291) was the introduction of an
“exception” parameter, such that P(C|A) = 1 – P(exception) under h. The model also
requires parameters a and c for the probabilities P(A) and P(C) of the antecedent and
consequent of h. We implement Oaksford and Chater’s (2003) model, positing a = 0.22
and c = 0.27 (according to the “rarity” assumption), and an uniform prior on H = {h,h},
as suggested in Oaksford and Chater (2003, p. 296). We explored the implications of cal-
culating the expected usefulness of turning over each card, not only according to Shannon
entropy reduction, but for the whole set of entropy measures from the Sharma–Mittal
framework.11
Empirical data We first address how well different expected entropy reduction measures
correspond to empirical aggregate card selection frequencies in the task, with respect to
Oaksford and Chater’s (2003) model. For the selection frequencies, we use the abstract
selection task data as reported by Oaksford and Chater (1994, p. 613) and mentioned
above (89%, 16%, 62%, and 25% for A, not-A, C, and not-C, respectively).
1436 Vincenzo Crupi et al. / Cognitive Science 42 (2018)
Fig. 6 (top row) shows the rank correlation between relevance values and empirical
selection frequencies for each order and degree value from 0 to 20, in steps of 0.25. First
consider results for the model with P(exception) = 0 (Fig. 6, top left subplot). A wide
range of measures, including expected reduction of Shannon and Quadratic entropy, of
Oaskford and Chater’s (2003)
model with P(exception) = 0
Oaskford and Chater’s (2003) 
model with P(exception) = 0.1
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Fig. 6. Plots of rank correlation values for the expected reduction of various Sharma–Mittal entropies in
Oaksford and Chater’s (2003) model of the Wason selection task. In the top row, models of expected entropy
reduction are compared with empirical aggregate card selection frequencies. In the bottom row, instead, the
comparison is with theoretical choices implied by Wason’s original analysis of the task. In the left versus
right columns the conditional probability representation of “if vowel, then even number” rules out expections
or allows for them (with probability 0.1), respectively.
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some non-concave entropies (e.g., RSMð10;1:5Þ) and of measures with fairly high degree (e.g.,
RSMð10;8Þ) correlate perfectly with the rank of selection frequencies. However, if a high
degree measure with moderate or high order is used, the rank correlation is not perfect.
Consider for instance the Tsallis measure of degree 20 (i.e. RSMð20;20Þ). This leads to rele-
vance values for the A, not-A, C, and not-C cards of 0.0281, 0.0002, 0.0008, and 0.0084,
respectively. Because the relative ordering of the C and the not-C card is incorrect (from
the perspective of observed choices), the rank correlation is only 0.8. The same rank cor-
relation of 0.8 is obtained, but for a different reason, from strongly non-concave rele-
vance measures. RSMð20;0Þ , for instance, gives values of 1.181, 0.380, 1.054, and 0.372
(again for the A, not-A, C, and not-C cards, respectively), so that the not-A card is
deemed more informative than the not-C card by this relevance measure.
Let us now consider expected reduction of Origin entropy, RSMð0;0Þ , as an example of
the 0-order measures. It gives relevance values of 0.527, 0, 0, and 0.159 for the A, not-A,
C, and not-C cards, respectively. This is similar to Wason’s analysis of the task: only
the A and the not-C cards can falsify a hypothesis (namely, the dependence hypothesis
h), thus only those two cards have value. The other cards could change the relative
plausibility of h versus h; however, according to 0-order measures, no informational
value is achieved because no hypothesis is definitely ruled out. In this sense, 0-order
measures can be thought of as bringing elements of the original logical interpretation of
the selection task into the same unified information-theoretic framework including
Shannon and generalized entropies (see below for more on this). Interestingly, this does
not imply that the A and the not-C cards are equally valuable: in the model, the A card
offers a higher chance of falsifying h than the not-C card, so it is more valuable,
according to this analysis. Thus, while incorporating the basic idea of the importance of
possible falsification, the 0-order Sharma–Mittal formalization of informational value
offers something that the standard logical reading does not: a rationale for assessing the
relative value among those queries (the A and the not-C card) providing the possibility
of falsifying a hypothesis. The Origin entropy values and the empirical data agree that
the A card is most useful and (up to a tie) that the not-A card is least useful, but dis-
agree on virtually everything else; RSMð0;0Þ’s rank correlation to empirical card selection
frequencies is 0.6325.
What if Oaksford and Chater’s (2003) model is combined with exception parameter
P(exception) = 0.1, rather than 0? In this case, the empirical selection frequencies per-
fectly correlate with the theoretical values for an even wider range of measures than for
the “deterministic” model (Fig. 6, top right plot). For instance, Tsallis of degree 11, i.e.
RSMð11;11Þ , which had rank correlation of 0.8 with P(exception) = 0, has a perfect rank cor-
relation with 0.1. This is due to the relative ordering of the not-A and C cards. For the
P(exception) = 0 model, the A, not-A, C, and not-C cards had RSMð11;11Þ relevance of
0.059, 0.002, 0.012, and 0.016, respectively; with P(exception) = 0.1, the cards’ respec-
tive relevance values are 0.019, 0.001, 0.007, and 0.005. In addition, a dramatic differ-
ence between P(exception) = 0 and P(exception) = 0.1 arises for the 0-order measures. If
P(exception) > 0, even if very small, no amount of obtained data can ever lead to ruling
out a hypothesis in the model. Therefore, with P(exception) = 0.1 all cards have zero
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value for 0-order measures, and the correlation with behavioral data is undefined (plotted
black in Fig. 6).
A probabilistic understanding of Wason’s normative indications Finally, we discuss how
well the expected informational value of the cards, as calculated using Oaksford and Cha-
ter’s (2003) model and various Sharma–Mittal measures, corresponds to Wason’s original
interpretation of the task. We thus conducted the same analyses as above, but instead of
using the human selection frequencies we assumed that the A card was selected with
100%, the not-A card with 0%, the C card with 0%, and the not-C card with 100% proba-
bility. The 0-order relevance measures, again within Oaksford and Chater’s (2003) model
with P(exception) = 0, provide a probabilistic understanding of Wason’s normative indi-
cations. Like Wason, the 0-order measures deem only the A and the not-C cards to be use-
ful when P(exception) = 0. The rank correlation with theoretical selection frequencies from
Wason’s analysis is 0.94 (see Fig. 6, bottom left plot). Why is the correlation not perfect?
The probabilistic understanding proposed, as discussed above, goes beyond the logical anal-
ysis: because the A card offers a higher probability of falsification than the not-C card does
in the probability model, the 0-order relevance measures value the former more than the
latter. Recall that our hypothetical participants always select both cards that entail the possi-
bility of falsifying the dependence hypothesis; thus, the correlation is < 1. The worst corre-
lation with Wason’s ranking is from the strongly non-concave measures, such as RSMð20;0Þ ;
this correlation is exactly zero.
The Wason selection task illustrates the theoretical potential of the Sharma–Mittal
framework; whereas other authors noted the robustness of probabilistic analyses of the
task across different measures of informational utility (see Fitelson & Hawthorne, 2010;
Nelson, 2005; pp. 985–986; Oaksford & Chater, 2007), the variety of measures involved
in those analyses arose in an ad hoc way. We extend those results, and show that even
the traditional, allegedly anti-Bayesian reading of the task can be recovered smoothly in
one overarching framework. In particular, the implications of Wason’s Popperian interpre-
tation can be represented well by the maximization of the expected reduction of an
entirely balanced (order-0) Sharma–Mittal measure (such as Origin or Hartley entropy) in
a deterministic reading of the task (i.e., with P(exception) = 0). Conversely, this means
that adopting a probabilistic approach to Wason’s task is not by itself sufficient to
account for observed behavior. Even then, in fact, people’s choices would still diverge
from at least some theoretically viable models of information search.
6.2. Information search in experience-based studies
Is the same expected uncertainty reduction measure able to account for human behav-
ior across a variety of tasks? To explore this issue, we reviewed experimental scenarios
employed in experience-based investigations of information search behavior. In this
experimental paradigm, participants learn the underlying statistical structure of an envi-
ronment where items (plankton specimens) are visually displayed and subject to a binary
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classification (kind A vs. B) for which two binary features (yellow vs. black eye; dark vs.
light claw) are potentially relevant. Immediate feedback is provided after each trial in a
learning phase, until a performance criterion is reached, indicating adequate mastery of
the environmental statistics. In a subsequent information-acquisition test phase of this
procedure, both of the two features (eye and claw) are obscured, and participants have to
select the most informative/useful feature relative to the target categories (kinds of plank-
ton). (See Nelson et al., 2010, for a detailed description.) In our current terms, these sce-
narios concern a binary hypothesis space H = {specimen of kind A, specimen of kind B}
and two binary tests E = {yellow eye, black eye} and F = {dark claw, light claw}. In
each case, the experience-based learning phase conveyed the structure of the joint proba-
bility distribution P(H,E,F) to participants. The test phase, in which either feature E or F
can be viewed, represents a way to see whether the participants deemed RP H;Eð Þ or
RP H;Fð Þ to be greater.
Overall, we found eight relevant experimental scenarios from the experimental para-
digm described above (they are listed in Table 4) in which there was at least some
Table 4
Choices between two binary tests/experiments (E vs. F) for a binary classification problem (H) in experience-
based experimental procedures. Cases 1–3 are taken from Nelson et al. (2010); cases 4–5 from Exp. 3 in the
same article; case 6 is an unpublished study using the same experimental procedure; cases 7–8 are from
Meder and Nelson (2012, Exp. 1)
n. P(H) Test E Test F % observed
choices of E
P(H|e) versus
P(H|e)
P(e) versus
P(e)
P(H| f) versus
P(H| f )
P(f) versus
P( f )
1 {0.7, 0.3} {0, 1}
{0.754, 0.246}
0.072
0.928
{1, 0}
{0.501, 0.499}
0.399
0.601
82% (23/28)
2 {0.7, 0.3} {0, 1}
{0.767, 0.233}
0.087
0.913
{1, 0}
{0.501, 0.499}
0.399
0.601
82% (23/28)
3 {0.7, 0.3} {0.109, 0.891}
{0.978, 0.022}
0.320
0.680
{1, 0}
{0.501, 0.499}
0.399
0.601
97% (28/29)
4 {0.7, 0.3} {0, 1}
{0.733, 0,.267}
0.045
0.955
{1, 0}
{0.501, 0.499}
0.399
0.601
89% (8/9)
5 {0.7, 0.3} {0.201, 0.799}
{0.780, 0.220}
0.139
0.861
{1, 0}
{0.501, 0.499}
0.399
0.601
70% (14/20)
6 {0.7, 0.3} {0.135, 0.865}
{0.848, 0.152}
0.208
0.792
{1, 0}
{0.501, 0.499}
0.399
0.601
70% (14/20)
7 {0.44, 0.56} {0.595, 0.405}
{0.331, 0.669}
0.414
0.586
{0, 1}
{0.502, 0.498}
0.123
0.877
60% (12/20)
8 {0.36, 0.64} {0.090, 0.910}
{0.707, 0.293}
0.562
0.438
{0, 1}
{0.501, 0.499}
0.282
0.118
79% (15/19)
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interesting disagreement among the Sharma–Mittal measures about which feature is more
useful. For each, we derived values of expected uncertainty reduction from Sharma–Mit-
tal measures of order and degree from 0 to 20, in increments of 0.25, and we computed
the simple proportion of cases in which each measure’s ranking of RP H;Eð Þ and
RP H;Fð Þ matched the most prevalent observed choice.
Nelson et al. (2010) devised their scenarios to dissociate predictions from a sample of
competing and historically influential models of rational information search. Their conclu-
sion was that the expected reduction of Error entropy (expected probability gain, in their
terminology) accounted for participants’ behavior and outperformed the expected reduc-
tion of Shannon entropy (expected information gain, in their terminology). A more compre-
hensive analysis within our current approach implies a richer picture. The data set employed
can be accurately represented in the Sharma–Mittal framework for a significant range of
degree values provided that the order parameter is high enough (the results are displayed in
Fig. 7, left side). Observed choices are especially consistent with expected reduction of a
quite unbalanced (e.g., r ≥ 4), concave or quasi-concave (t close to 2) Sharma–Mittal
entropy measure. Importantly, there is overlap between results from modeling the Wason
selection task and these experience-based learning data, giving hope to the idea that a uni-
fied theoretical explanation of human behavior may extend across several tasks.
6.3. Information search in words-and-numbers studies
The experience-based learning tasks discussed above were inspired by analogous tasks
in which the prior probabilities of categories and feature likelihoods were presented to
participants using words and numbers (e.g., Skov & Sherman, 1986). We refer to such
tasks as Planet Vuma experiments, reflecting the typically whimsical content, such as
classifying species of aliens on Planet Vuma, designed to not conflict with people’s expe-
rience with real object categories.
Whereas expected reduction of Error entropy, and other models as discussed above,
gives a plausible explanation of the experience-based learning task data, individual data
in words-and-numbers studies are very noisy, and no attempt has been made to see
whether a unified theory could account for the modal responses across these tasks. We
therefore re-analyzed empirical data from several Planet Vuma experiments, in a manner
analogous to our analyses of the experience-based learning data above (Fig. 7). What do
the results show? To our surprise, the results suggest that there may be a systematic
explanation of people’s behavior on words-and-numbers-based tasks.
The degree of the most plausible measures is considerably above the Arimoto curve,
although not as high as, for instance, non-certainty entropy (order 30). From a descriptive
psychological standpoint, a plausible interpretation is that when confronted with words-
and-numbers-type tasks, people have a strong focus on the chances of obtaining a certain
or near-to-certain result, and are less concerned with (or, perhaps, attuned to) the details
of the individual items in the probability distribution. The Sharma–Mittal framework pro-
vides potential explanation for heretofore perplexing experimental results, while also
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highlighting key questions (e.g., how much preference for near-certainty, exactly, do sub-
jects have) for future empirical research on words-and-numbers tasks.
6.4. Unifying theory and intuition in the Person Game (Having your cake and eating it too)
In this section, we introduce another theoretical conundrum from the literature, and
show how the Sharma–Mittal framework may help solve it. As pointed out above, the
expected reduction of Error entropy had appeared initially to provide the best explanation
of people’s intuitions and behavior on experience-based-learning-based information search
tasks (Nelson et al., 2010). But this model leads to potentially counterintuitive behavior
on another interesting kind of information search task, namely the Person Game (a variant
of the Twenty Questions game). In this game, n cards (say, 20) with different faces are
presented. One of those faces has been chosen at random (with equal probability) to be
the correct face in a particular round of the game. The player’s task is to find the true
face in the smallest number of yes/no questions about physical features of the faces. For
Table 5
Choices between two binary tests/experiments (E vs. F) for a binary classification problem (H) in words-and-
numbers (Vuma Planet) experiments. Cases 1–6 are from Nelson (2005); case 7 is from Skov and Sherman
(1986), cases 8–10 are from Nelson et al. (2010); cases 11–13 from Wu, Meder, Filimon, and Nelson (2017,
Exp. 1–3). In each case, test E was deemed more useful than test F by the participants. We only report sce-
narios for which at least two Sharma–Mittal measures strictly disagree about which of the tests has higher
expected usefulness. (Thus, not all feature queries involved in the original articles are listed here.) Nelson
(2005) asked participants to give a rank ordering among four possible features’ information values. Here we
list the six corresponding pairwise comparisons, in each case labeling the feature that was ranked higher as
the favorite one (E). Wu et al. (2017) studied 14 different probability, natural frequency, and graphical infor-
mation formats for the presentation of relevant probabilities. For comparison with other studies, we take
results only from the standard probability format here
n. P(H)
Test E Test F
P(e|h) P(ejh) P( f|h) P( f jh)
1 {0.5, 0.5} 0.70 0.30 0.99 1.00
2 {0.5, 0.5} 0.30 0.0001 0.99 1.00
3 {0.5, 0.5} 0.01 0.99 0.99 1.00
4 {0.5, 0.5} 0.30 0.0001 0.70 0.30
5 {0.5, 0.5} 0.01 0.99 0.30 0.0001
6 {0.5, 0.5} 0.01 0.99 0.70 0.30
7 {0.5, 0.5} 0.90 0.55 0.65 0.30
8 {0.7, 0.3} 0.57 0 0 0.24
9 {0.7, 0.3} 0.57 0 0 0.29
10 {0.7, 0.3} 0.05 0.95 0.57 0
11 {0.7, 0.3} 0.41 0.93 0.03 0.30
12 {0.7, 0.3} 0.43 1.00 0.04 0.37
13 {0.72, 0.28} 0.03 0.83 0.39 1.00
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instance, asking whether the person has a beard would be a possible question, E = {e,e},
with e = beard and e = no beard. If k < n is the number of characters with a beard, then
P(e) = k/n and P(e) = (n – k)/n. Moreover, a “yes” answer will leave k equiprobable
guesses still in play, and a “no” answer n – k such guesses.
Fig. 8. The expected entropy reduction of a binary question E = {e,e} in the Person Game with a hypothesis set
H of size 40 (the possible guesses, that is, characters initially in play) as a function of the proportion of possible
guesses remaining after getting datum e (e.g., a “yes” answer to “has the chosen person a beard?”). Questions
are deemed most valuable with the zero-degree entropy measures (bottom right plot). Although the shape of the
curve is similar for the degree t = 0 and degree t = 1 measures, the actual information value (see the y axis)
decreases as the degree increases. For degree t = 2 (for example for Error entropy), every question is equally
useful (provided that there is some uncertainty about the answer; bottom left plot). If the degree is > 2, then the
least-equally-split questions (e.g., 1:39 questions, in the case of 40 items) are deemed most useful (left column,
top and middle row). The order parameter is irrelevant for purposes of evaluating questions’ expected usefulness
in the Person Game, because all prior and possible posterior probability distributions are uniform (see text).
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Several papers have reported (see Nelson et al., 2014, for references) that people pref-
erentially ask about features that are possessed by close to 50% of the remaining possible
items, thus with P(e) close to 0.5. This strategy can be labeled the split-half heuristic. It
is optimal to minimize the expected number of questions needed under some task variants
(Navarro & Perfors, 2011), although not in the general case (Nelson, Meder, & Jones,
2016), and can be accounted for using expected Shannon entropy reduction. But expected
Shannon entropy reduction cannot account for people’s behavior on experience-based
learning information search tasks, as our above analyses show. Can expected Error
entropy reduction account for these results and intuitions? Put more broadly, can the same
entropy model provide a satisfying account for both the Person Game and the experience-
based learning tasks? As it happens, Error entropy cannot account for the preference to
split the remaining items close to 50%. In fact, every possible question (unless its answer
is known already, because none or all of the remaining faces have the feature) has exactly
the same expected Error entropy reduction, namely 1/k, where there are k items remaining
(Nelson et al., 2016). This might lead us to wonder whether we must have different
entropy/information models to account for people’s intuitions and behavior across these
different tasks. Indeed, it would call into question the potential for a unified and general
purpose theory of the psychological value of information.
It turns out that the findings on why expected Shannon entropy reduction favors ques-
tions close to a 50:50 split, and why Error entropy has no such preference, apply much
more generally than to Shannon and Error entropy. In fact, for all Sharma–Mittal mea-
sures, the ordinal evaluation of questions on the Person Game is solely a function of the
degree of the entropy measure, and has nothing to do with the order of the measure (Sup-
plementary Material S1, section 5). Among other things, this implies that all entropy-
based measures with degree t = 1 have the exact same preferences as expected Shannon
entropy reduction, and all of them quantify the usefulness of querying a feature as a func-
tion of the proportion of remaining items that possess that feature. Similarly, all degree-2
measures, and not only Error entropy, deem all questions to be equally useful in the Per-
son Game. The core of this insight stems from the fact that, if a probability distribution
is uniform, then the entropy of that distribution depends only on the degree of a Sharma–
Mittal entropy measure. More formally, for any set of hypotheses H = {h1, h2, . . . hn}
with a uniform probability distribution U(H):
ent
SMðr;tÞ
U Hð Þ ¼ lnt nð Þ
Fig. 8 shows how possible questions are valued, in the Person Game, as a function of
the proportion of remaining items that possess a particular feature. We see that if t = 1,
as for Shannon and all Renyi entropies, questions with close to a 50:50 split are pre-
ferred. If the degree t is > 1 but < 2, questions with close to a 50:50 split are still pre-
ferred, but less so. If t = 2, then 1:99 and 50:50 questions are deemed equally useful.
Remarkably, if the degree is > 2, then a 1:99 question is preferred to a 50:50 question.
While the choice of particular Sharma–Mittal measures is only partly constrained by
observed preferences in the Person Game alone (and specifically the value of the order
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parameter r is not), nothing in principle would guarantee that a joint and coherent account
of such behavior and other findings exists. It is then important to point out that one can, in
fact, pick up an entropy measure whereby the experience-based data above follow along
with a greater informative value for 50:50 questions than for 1:99 questions in the Person
Game. For instance, medium-order Arimoto entropies (such as entSMð10;1:9Þ) will work.
7. General discussion
In this paper, we have presented a general framework for the formal analysis of uncer-
tainty, the Sharma–Mittal entropy formalism. This framework generates a comprehensive
approach to the informational value of queries (questions, tests, experiments) as the
expected reduction of uncertainty. The amount of theoretical insight and unification
achieved is remarkable, in our view. Moreover, such a framework can help us understand
existing empirical results, and point out important research questions for future investiga-
tion of human intuition and reasoning processes as concerns uncertainty and information
search.
Mathematically, the parsimony of the Sharma–Mittal formalism is appealing and yields
decisive advantages in analytic manipulations, derivations, and calculations, too. Within
the domain of cognitive science, no earlier attempt has been made to unify so many
existing models concerning information search/acquisition behavior. Notably, this
involves both popular candidate rational measures of informational utility (such as the
expected reduction of Shannon or Error entropy) and avowed heuristic models, such as
Baron et al.’s (1988, 106) quasi-Popperian heuristic (maximization of the expected num-
ber of hypotheses ruled out, i.e., the expected reduction of Origin entropy) and Nelson
et al.’s (2010, 962) “probability-of-certainty” heuristic (closely approximated by the
expected reduction of a high degree Tsallis entropy, or a similar measure). In addition,
once applied to uncertainty and information search, the Sharma–Mittal parameters are not
dumb mathematical construals, but rather capture cognitively and behaviorally meaningful
ideas. Roughly, the order parameter, r, captures how much one disregards minor hypothe-
ses (via the kind of means applied to the probability values in P(H)). The degree parame-
ter t, on the other hand, captures how much one cares about getting (very close) to
certainty (via the behavior of the surprise/atomic information function; see Fig. 3). Thus,
high order indicates a strong focus on the prevalent (most likely) element in the hypothe-
sis set and lack of consideration for minor possibilities. A very low order, on the other
hand, implies a Popperian or quasi-Popperian attitude in the assessment of tests, with a
marked appreciation of potentially falsifying or almost falsifying evidence. The degree
parameter, in turn, has important implications for how much potentially conclusive exper-
iments are valued, as compared to experiments that are informative but not conclusive.
Moreover, for each particular order, if the degree is higher than the corresponding Ari-
moto entropy (and in any case if the order is < 0.5 or the degree is at least 2), then the
concavity of the entropy measure guarantees that no experiment will be rated as having
negative expected usefulness.
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Even according to fairly cautious views such as Aczel’s (1984), the above remarks
seem to provide a fairly strong motivation to consider pursuing a generalized
approach. Here is another possible concern, however. Uncertainty and the informa-
tional value of tests may be involved in many arguments concerning human cognition.
Now we see that those notions can be formalized in many different ways, such that
different properties (say, additivity, or non-negativity) are or are not implied. Thus,
the arguments at issue might be valid for some choices of the corresponding measures
and not for others. This point has been labeled the issue of measure-sensitivity in
related areas (Fitelson, 1999) — is it something to be worried about? Does it raise
problems for our proposal?
It is not uncommon for measure-sensitivity to foster skeptical or dismissive reactions
on the prospects of the formal analysis of the concept at issue (e.g. Hurlbert, 1971;
Kyburg & Teng, 2001, pp. 98 ff.). However, measure-sensitivity is a widespread and
mundane phenomenon. In areas related to the formal analysis of reasoning, the issue
arises, for instance, for Bayesian theories of inductive confirmation (e.g., Br€ossel, 2013;
Crupi & Tentori, 2016; Festa & Cevolani, 2017; Glass, 2013; Hajek & Joyce, 2008;
Roche & Shogenji, 2014), scoring rules and measures of accuracy (e.g., D’Agostino &
Sinigaglia, 2010; Leitgeb & Pettigrew, 2010a,b; Levinstein, 2012; Predd et al., 2009),
and measures of causal strength (e.g., Fitelson & Hitchcock, 2011; Griffiths & Tenen-
baum, 2005, 2009; Meder, Mayrhofer, & Waldmann, 2014; Sprenger, 2016). Our treat-
ment contributes to make the same point explicit for measures of uncertainty and the
informational value of experiments. This we see as a constructive contribution. The
prominence of one specific measure in one research domain may well have been partly
affected by historical contingencies. As a consequence, when a theoretical or experimen-
tal inference relies on the choice of one measure, it makes sense to check how robust it
is across different choices or, alternatively, to acknowledge which measure-specific prop-
erties support the conclusion and how compelling they are. Having a plurality of related
measures available is indeed an important opportunity. It prompts thorough investigation
of the features of alternative options and their relationships (e.g., Crupi, Chater, & Ten-
tori, 2013; Huber & Schmidt-Petri, 2009; Nelson, 2005, 2008), it can provide a rich
source of tools for both theorizing and the design of new experimental investigations
(e.g., Rusconi et al., 2014; Schupbach, 2011; Tentori, Crupi, Bonini, & Osherson, 2007),
and it makes it possible to tailor specific models to varying tasks and contexts within an
otherwise coherent approach (e.g., Crupi & Tentori, 2014; Dawid & Musio, 2014; Oaks-
ford & Hahn, 2007).
Which Sharma–Mittal measures are more consistent with observed behavior overall?
According to our analyses, a subset of Sharma–Mittal information search models receives
a significant amount of convergent support. We found that measures of high but finite
order accounting for the experience-based (plankton task) data (Fig. 7, left side) are also
empirically adequate for abstract selection task data (Fig. 6, top row) and results from a
Twenty Questions kind of task such as the Person Game (Fig. 8). On the other hand, the
best fit with words-and-numbers (Planet Vuma) information search tasks indicates a dif-
ferent kind of model within the Sharma–Mittal framework (Fig. 7, right side). For these
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cases, our analysis thus suggests that people’s behavior may comply with different mea-
sures in different situations, so a key question arises about the features of a task which
affect such variation in a consistent way, such as a comparably stronger appreciation of
certainty or quasi-certainty as prompted by an experimental procedure conveying environ-
mental statistics by explicit verbal and numerical stimuli.
Beyond this broad outlook, our discussion also allows for the resolution of a number
of puzzles. Let us mention a last one. Nelson et al. (2010) had concluded from their
experimental investigations that human information search in an experience-based setting
was appropriately accounted for by maximization of the expected reduction of Error
entropy. This specific model, however, exhibits some questionable properties related to
its lack of mathematical continuity: in particular, if the most likely hypothesis in H is not
changed by any possible evidence in E, then the latter has no informational utility what-
soever according to RError, no matter if it can rule out other non-negligible hypotheses in
the set (see, e.g., cases 1 and 6 in Table 4). Findings from Baron et al. (1988) suggest
that this might not describe human judgment adequately. In that study, participants were
given a fictitious medical diagnosis scenario with P(H) = {0.64, 0.24, 0.12}, and a series
of possible binary tests including E such that P(H|e) = {0.47, 0.35, 0.18},
P(H|e) = {1,0,0} and P(e) = 0.68 and another completely irrelevant test F (with an even
chance of a positive/negative result on each one of the elements in H, so that P(H| f) =
P(H| f ) = P(H)). According to RError, tests E and F are both equally worthless —
RErrorP H;Eð Þ ¼ RErrorP H;Fð Þ ¼ 0 — because hypothesis h1 2 H remains the most likely no
matter what. Participants’ mean ratings of the usefulness of E and F were markedly dif-
ferent, however: 0.48 versus 0.09 (on a 0–1 scale). Indeed, rating E higher than F seems
at least reasonable, contrary to what RError implies. In the Sharma–Mittal framework, rec-
onciliation is possible: expected reduction of a relatively high order (say, 10) entropy
measure from the Arimoto family would account for Nelson et al.’s (2010) and similar
findings (see Fig. 7), and still would not put test E above on a par with the entirely point-
less test F. Indeed, given our theoretical background and the limited empirical indications
available, such a measure would count as a plausible choice in our view, had one to pick
up a specific entropy underlying a widely applicable model of the informational utility of
experiments. Moreover, this kind of operation has wider scope. Origin entropy, for
instance, may imply largely appropriate ratings in some contexts (say, biological) and yet
not be well-behaved because of its discontinuities: a Sharma–Mittal measure such as
entSMð0:1;0:1Þ would then closely approximate the former while avoiding the latter.
Many further empirical issues can be addressed. For one instance, our analysis of
human data in Tables 4 and 5 and Fig. 7 provides relatively weak and indirect evidence
against non-concave entropy measures as a basis for the assessment of the informational
utility of queries by human agents. However, strongly diverging predictions can be gener-
ated from concave versus non-concave measures (as illustrated in cases 6 and 7, Table 3),
and hence put to empirical test. Moreover, our explanatory reanalysis of prior work was
based on the aggregate data reported in earlier articles — but how does this extend to
individual behavior? We are aware of no studies that address questions of whether there
are meaningful individual differences in the psychology of information. Thus, while
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inferences about individuals should be the goal (Lee, 2011), this requires future research,
perhaps with adaptive Bayesian experimental design techniques (Kim, Pitt, Lu, Stey-
vers, & Myung, 2014). Better models of individual-level psychology could also serve
the goal of identifying the information that would be most informative for individual
human learners (Gureckis & Markant, 2012), potentially enhancing automated tutor sys-
tems. Another idea concerns the direct assessment of uncertainty, e.g., whether more
uncertainty is perceived in, say, P(H) = {0.49, 0.49, 0.02} versus P*(H) = {0.70, 0.15,
0.15}. Judgments of this kind are likely to play a role in human reasoning and deci-
sion-making and may be plausibly modulated by a number of interesting factors. More-
over, an array of relevant predictions can be generated from the Sharma–Mittal
framework to dissociate subsets of entropy measures. Yet as far as we know, and rather
surprisingly, no established experimental procedure exists for a direct behavioral mea-
surement of the judged overall uncertainty concerning a hypothesis set; this is another
important area for future investigation.
Acknowledgements
This research was supported by grants CR 409/1–2, NE 1713/1–2, and ME 3717/2–2
from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft as part of the priority program New Frame-
works of Rationality (SPP 1516). We thank Nick Chater, Laura Martignon, Andrea
Passerini, and Paul Pedersen for helpful comments and exchanges.
Notes
1 For technical reasons, we will assume P(yj) > 0 for any j. This is largely a safe pro-
viso for our current purposes. In fact, in our setting with both X and Y finite sets,
any zero probability outcome in Y could just be omitted.
2 entQuad also quantifies the overall expected inaccuracy of probability distribution
P(H) as measured by the so-called Brier score (i.e., the squared Euclidean distance
from the possible truth-value assignments over H; see Brier, 1950; Leitgeb & Petti-
grew, 2010a,b; Pettigrew, 2013; Selten, 1998). Festa (1993, 137 ff.) also gives a
useful discussion of Quadratic entropy in the philosophy of science, including Car-
nap’s (1952) classical work in inductive logic.
3 The quantity ln(1/P(h)) also characterizes a popular approach to the measurement of
the inaccuracy of probability distribution P(H) when h is the true element in H (so-
called logarithmic score), and entShannon can be seen as computing the expected
inaccuracy of P(H) accordingly (see Good, 1952; also see Gneiting & Raftery,
2007).
4 An early example is Baron’s (1985, ch, 4) presentation of RError, following Savage
(1972, ch. 6). Experimental investigations on whether RError can account for actual
patterns of reasoning include Baron, Beattie, and Hershey (1988), Bramley et al.
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(2015), Meder and Nelson (2012), Nelson et al. (2010), and Rusconi, Marelli,
D’Addario, Russo, and Cherubini (2014), while Crupi, Tentori, and Lombardi
(2009) relied on RError in their critical analysis of so-called pseudodiagnosticity
(also see Crupi & Girotto, 2014; Tweeney, Doherty, & Kleiter, 2010).
5 The idea of lnt is often credited to Tsallis for his work in generalized thermody-
namics (see Tsallis, 1988, 2011). The mathematical point may well go back to
Euler, however (see Hoffmann, 2008, p. 7). For more theory, also see Havrda and
Charvat (1967), Daroczy (1970), Naudts (2002), Kaniadakis, Lissia, and Scarfone
(2004).
6 In theories of the so-called imprecise probabilities, the notion arises of a detrimental
experiment E in the sense that interval probability estimates for each element in a
hypothesis set of interest H can be properly included in the corresponding interval
probability estimates conditional on each element in E. This phenomenon is known
as dilation: one’s initial state of credence about H becomes less precise (thus more
uncertain, under a plausible interpretation) no matter how an experiment turns out.
The strongly unattractive character of this implication has been sometimes disre-
garded (for an example in the psychology of reasoning, see Tweeney et al., 2010),
but the prevailing view is that appropriate moves are required to avoid it or dispel
it (for recent discussions, see Bradley & Steele, 2014; Pedersen & Wheeler, 2014).
7 This important result is proven in Hoffmann (2008), and already mentioned in
Taneja, Pardo, Morales, and Menendez (1989, p. 61), who in turn refer to van der
Pyl (1978) for a proof. We did not posit concavity as a defining property of entro-
pies, and that’s how it should be, in our opinion. Concavity may definitely be con-
venient or even required in some applications, but barring non-concave functions
would be overly restrictive as concerns the formal notion of entropy. In physics, for
instance, concavity is taken as directly relevant for generalized thermodynamics
(Beck, 2009, p. 499; Tsallis, 2004; p. 10). In biological applications, on the other
hand, concavity was suggested by Lewontin (1972; also see Rao, 2010, p. 71), but
seen as having “no intuitive motivation” by Patil and Taille (1982, p. 552).
8 We used three-hypothesis scenarios to illustrate the differences among our selected
sample of R measures, because scenarios of this kind appeared to offer a reasonable
balance of being simple yet powerful enough to deliver divergences that are strong
and intuitively clear. Note, however, that two-hypothesis scenarios can also clearly
differentiate many of the R measures (see the review of behavioral research on bin-
ary classification tasks in the subsequent sections).
9 It is important to note that the procedures we used do not guarantee finding globally
maximal solutions; thus, a failure to find a case of strong disagreement does not
necessarily entail that no such case exists.
10 One should note, however, that Tsallis 30, unlike pure non-certainty entropy, is a
continuous function. As a consequence, the approximation described eventually
fails when one gets very close to limiting cases. More precisely, Tsallis 30 entropy
rapidly decreases for almost certain distributions such as, say, P(H) = {0.998,
0.001, 0.001}. In fact, Tsallis 30 entropy is sizable and almost constant if P(H)
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conveys a less-than-almost-certain state of belief, and becomes largely negligible
otherwise.
11 To fit the relevant patterns of responses, we pursued a variety of methods, including
optimizing Hattori’s “selection tendency function” (which maps expected entropy
reduction onto the predicted probability that a card will be selected, see Hattori,
1999, 2002; also see Stringer, Borsboom, & Wagenmakers, 2011), or taking previ-
ously reported parameters for Hattori’s selection tendency function; Spearman rank
correlation coefficients; and Pearson correlations. Similar results were obtained
across these methods. Because the rank correlations are simple to discuss, we focus
on those here. Full simulation results for these and other measures, model variants
with other values of P(exception), and Matlab code, are available from J.D.N.
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